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ARE NUMBERS’ MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS SPATIALLY ENCODED?
Abstract Current cognitive accounts on numbers’ mental representa-
tions do not agree on their spatial-sensitive nature. On one
hand, a Internalist neuro-based approach, supported by trans-
notational conservation of cognitive effects related with math-
ematical tasks has postulate a quantity-based analogical for-
mat while the concurrent Externalist problem solving based
approach has suggested that some of the primitive components
of numbers’ mental representation might depend directly to the
spatial features of numbers’ written representations. The pur-
pose of this article is an epistemological and descriptive one.
Advocating for the second tradition, we shall present both ac-
counts, focusing on exotic cases of non-positional number sys-
tems, to disentangle their shallow contradiction.
Keywords Mental calculation, numbers systems, spatial reasoning, repre-
sentational effect
2
Introduction
T
his article do not have anything to do with numbers per se as numbers theory
does nor is it directly concerned with history of algebra. The main purpose
of this paper is to investigate the impact of numeration on effective calculus real-
ized by a finite automaton; namely the human mind. Even if this view sounds very
subjective or solipsist, numerous historical approaches such as the formalist (Hilbert
and Ackermann 1928), intuitionist (Brouwer 1992a,b,c) or algorithmic schools (Kol-
mogorov and Uspenskii 1958) endorsed what became a classical idea in theory of
demonstration following which a proof – thus a calculus – is a finite number of formal
operations from some syntactic object (premices) to an other (result).
The reader may wonder what such a view has to do with daily calculus. The
first indication is an introspective one: the fact that, for some complex operations,
subjects report doing the calculus as if they were writing it on a mental board. The
second comes from historical experimental results which suggest ”[...] that cognitive
operations are not independent of the symbols that instigate them and that ”informa-
tion” is not wholly separable from its embodiment in a symbol system. ” (Gonzalez
and Kolers 1982:319). In the same idea, many comparative analysis suggest that
European and Asian child populations do not apprehend place values of the Hindu-
Arabic system in the same fashion (Miura et al. 1993) because of some practices such
as hand counting (Domahs et al. 2010). Finally, it should be stressed that this issue
differs from the influence of surface features on mathematical problem solving – see
Brissiaud and Sander 2010 for an example – for it is concerned with the very influ-
ence of numbers physical features themselves rather than the bias induced by the
formulation of a given concrete problem as Becker and Varelas 1993 distinguished
3
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it.
We will first described the main features of non-positional numbers systems –
sec.1– to present two very different historical frameworks in sec.2 and sec.3 opposi-
tion of which concerns the very status of external representations of numbers toward
internal ones. In sec.4, the reasons why these two cognitive accounts did not dis-
cuss before recently will be highlighted. With the help of current research on the
subject, we will suggest that, in the absence of precision of the kind of mathemat-
ical tasks, these two frameworks do not contradict each other and could well be
complementary.
1 What is a (non)standard number system: a syntactic ac-
count
The easiest way for suggesting what a non Standard Positional Number System
(n-SPNS) is consists in suggesting the common properties of Standard Positional
Number System (SPNS).
Standard Positional Number System are the most used systems in the modern
world. The 10-based Hindu-Arabic system –eq.1– is only one way to express numbers
for it is possible to convert it in 7-based –eq.2–, 2-based –eq.3. The main property
of a positional number system lies in the notion of digit provided that every single
number can be, for a given base b, decomposed by the order of its digits (d) in the
polynomial way presented in eq.4.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10... (1)
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1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12... (2)
0, 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, 110, 111, 1000, 1001, 1010... (3)
dn ∗ b
n + dn−1 ∗ b
n−1 + dn−2 ∗ b
n−2 + ..... + d1 ∗ b+ d0 (4)
In fact, as eq.5 suggests it, one can get rid of Arabic digits provided that she has
an ordered set of symbols – e.g. ♣,♠,. Most of the symbols sets used in computer
sciences are also, no matter how large, ordinate ones as the well known hexadecimal
coding (16-based: 0-F).
♣,♠,,♠♣,♠♠,♠,♣,♠,,♠♣♣,♠♣♠... (5)
non-Standard Positional Number System lack one of the properties of SPNS.
Even if some systems are merely non-positional – we can imagine, for instance, an
unstructured extensional system in which one add only ”” for every new object
– most of the n-SPNS remain syntactically ordoned on one dimension. Though,
the base b can be negative (Kempner 1936), real (Frougny 1992) or even a complex
number as the Quater-Imaginary Numeral system of Knuth 1960. An other family
of n-SPNS combines two bases such as the Babylonian Sexagesimal system (b1 = 60
and b2 = 10) (Powell 1976). Finally, the non-standardness of some systems such
as the Balanced Ternary –eq.6– or the set-theoretic way of writing numbers –eq.7–
seems more dependent of syntactical features; more graphical so to speak.
0, 1, 1T, 10, 11, 1TT, 1T0, 1T1, 10T, 100, 101 (6)
∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}}, (7)
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{∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}}}, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}}}},
{∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}}}}}, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}}}}}},
{∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅, {∅}}}}}}}}}}
Figure 1: Generative gram-
mar of Binary Number Sys-
tem
One may say that these differences concern only
bases or writing. We would like to show that some of
the features of n-SPNS have a direct impact on the
syntactical aspect of numbers on a deeper level than
purely graphical criterion. Despite the fact that n-
SPNS remain syntactically ordoned on one dimension
–i,e. written on a structured line– the syntactical rules
used for, say, add 1 seem more complex than those used
in SPNS such as the Hindu-Arabic system. Given that written numbers are strings
of characters, it is possible to describe theses numbers as products of finite state
automatons –i,e. Turing Machines 2– similar to those used in generative grammars
3.
As an illustration, tab.1 compare two famous SPNS (resp n-SPNS): strictly pos-
itive binary notation and a subset of Roman number system. Here we need to
highlight two points. Firstly, even if the length of both set of symbols does not
vary much –3 Vs 4– n-SPNS is grammatically much more complex than the binary
system. However, this complexity doesn’t have much to do with the number of state
2Many Turing machines presentation rely on a 4-uplet syntax which distinguishes move action from
writing action. However, given i) the functional equivalence and ii) the length of instruction list in 4-uplet
syntax, we will adopt here a 5-uplet syntax < Stateactual, Symboleread, Statenext, Symbolewritten,move >.
Here, will be the blank symbol and H , the ”Halt” state.
3We will restrain our example to the Roman Number system to sketch one of the more striking syn-
tactical features of n-SPNS instead of demonstrating the complete set of properties of all variations. For
a more exhaustive description of generative grammars of n-SPNS, see Frougny 1992.
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Binary system Roman system
Set of symbols 0,1, I, V, X,
List from 1 to 7 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, I, II, III, IV, V,
110, 111, 1000, 1001 V I, V II, V III, IX
Turing machine < S1, , S1, ,→> < S2, , S5, ,←> < S1, , S1, ,→> < S4, V, S6, ,→>
implementation < S1, 1, S2, 1,→> < S5, 1, S5, 1,←> < S1, I, S2, I,→> < S6, , S7, I,→>
< S2, 1, S2, 1,→> < S5, 0, S6, 1,→> < S2, I, S3, I,→> < S7, , H,X,→>
< S2, 0, S3, 0,→> < S6, 1, S6, 0,→> < S2, , H, I,→> < S1, V, S9, V,→>
< S3, 0, S3, 0,→> < S6, , H, ,→> < S3, I, S4, ,←> < S9, I, S2, I,→>
< S3, 1, S2, 1,→> < S3, , H, I,→> < S9, , H, I,→>
< S3, , S4, ,→> < S4, I, S4, ,←> < S2, V, S8, V,←>
< S4, , S4, ,←> < S4, , S5, I,→> < S8, I,H, ,→>
< S4, 0, H, 1,←> < S5, , H, V,→>
Diagram fig.1 fig.2
Table 1: Comparison of the complexity of to well known SPNS and n-SPNS
–6 Vs 8– but with transitional complexity. As fig.1 and fig.2 suggest it, we do not
have the same reflexive and symmetric loop able to scan the whole string before
effecting writing changes –see S2 and S3 relations in fig.1.
A contrario, the generative grammar responsible for Roman Number System
needs to multiply some apparently identical states to count the length of some
sections of the string to implement rules such as ”III + I = IV ”–see S2, S3 and S4
in fig.2. The reason why is that n-SPNS are different from place-valued SPNS; the
most relevant syntactical feature of n-SPNS is the length of some sub-strings and
the fact that their position in the whole string matter. In other words, generative
grammar of n-SPNS such as Roman Number System are string length sensitive.
This first syntactical account of SPNS and n-SPNS stress that the logic of the
later and the graphical component which implement it are very different than those
of the former. It is also clear that these differences do not have much to do with the
particular shape of the symbols but rather with some more fundamental features of
the number system considered.
Though, despite the intrinsic quality of the traditional Turing-based paradigm
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and its relevance in lots of cognitive fields such as formal linguistics, it would be na¨ıve
to think that an actual human being really watches every single symbol till the end
of the string before making linear transformations as in our example. Even if the
syntactical description remains one of the best way to highlight the main differences
between SPNS and n-SPNS, the cognitive aspect of calculation is not apparent yet
in such a framework.
2 Internal Representations of Numbers: a neural code for
mathematics
Figure 2: Generative grammar of Ro-
man Number System
History did not wait for the 90’ to propose
neural correlate of mathematical ability. Gall
and Spurzheim 1810’s phrenology, one of the
most famous account of the last century, pos-
tulated a special area dedicated to calculation
in the temporal lobe – near the constructive-
ness area. However, despite the general dis-
credit of this macro-scale neural instantiation, more parsimonious proposals emerged
during the 90’. Rather than speaking of a general ability for mathematics, what-
ever this can mean, modern studies focus on the possible neural correlate of some
mathematical task – especially equation solving in arithmetic – with a theoretical
framework which distinguishes different levels of processing from a recognitionnal
number extraction to computation.
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2.1 A new perspective on this old problem
We will focus mainly on the review presented in Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and
Cohen 1998 whose formula constitute the title of this subsection. The general thesis
of this article consists in suggesting a common ability to extract numerosity from
stimuli and compute these cardinal numbers across species. One of the main diffi-
culty with such a generic object consists in the fact that experimenters who have
access to merely non-numerical behaviours –e.g. a Rhesus monkey or a two months-
old children would not say anything about numbers but, rather, choose some set
faster among others – need to identify genuine numerical representations.
Number of what? According to Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen 1998,
the best functional criterion for identifying genuine numbers representation lies in
the notion of cardinality. As an abstract notion, cardinality refers to ”the number
of things with belong to the same set”. As a cognitive one, a subject can be said
to posses such general and extentionnal scheme if he is able to perform operations
which presuppose to get rid of the particularities of sets –e.g. sizes, colors, shapes– of
modalities –e.g. earing three sounds vs seeing three balls– or modes of presentation
–simultaneous vs sequential.
The case of children and animals As behavioural results testifying for such an
abstract number sense (Dehaene 1999), newborn have been shown, while accustomed
to see a certain number of object on the screen, to gaze for a longer time the different
slide (Antell and Keating 1983). Even though one could argue that this finding does
not account for an abstract notion of number, precautions such as variations of
objects (Strauss and Curtis 1981) and partial occlusion of the field (Van Loosbroek
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and Smitsman 1990) have been taken to avoid merely low-level visual effects. Besides
visual induced numerosity, children seem also able to recognize matching across
modalities (Starkey, E. S. Spelke, and Gelman 1983, 1990) and to perform basic
numerical operations (Koechlin 1997; Wynn 1992).
Even in the animal kingdom, similar numerosity identifications and basic opera-
tion have been demonstrated for rats (Meck and Church 1983). Besides the Arabic
digit recognition and use (Matsuzawa 1985), chimpanzees seem also able to perform
simple operations (Pe´russe and Rumbaugh 1990).
2.2 What role does the external world play ?
Numerical distance and Number size effects An other group of experimental
studies suggests that animal and human representations of numerosity share a com-
mon feature which make them sensitive to distance effect on rate of error in compar-
ison tasks. In other word, both humans (Gallistel and Gelman 1992) and animals
(Washburn and Rumbaugh 1991) tend to make less error in comparing • • • • • • ••
with •• than • • • • •• with • • • • •. Such an exponential decrease of errors over
distance is not retricted to set comparison for similar results has been found in the
human case for Arabic digits comparison (Dehaene, Dupoux, and Mehler 1990) and
even for for numbers below 10 (Dehaene 1996). Likewise, a similar effect on error
does not depend on distance between numbers but seems size-depended inasmuch
as comparison of 3 and 4 appears faster than 8 with 9 even for trained adults with
dots (Van Oeffelen and Vos 1982) or Arabic and written numbers.
The occurrence of a distance effect even when numbers are presented in a
symbolic notation suggests that the human brain converts numbers inter-
10
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nally from the symbolic format to a continuous, quantity-based analogical
format. (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen 1998:358)
Abstract numerical representations It should be emphasize that these two ef-
fects support the internalist conception of number representations endorsed by these
authors. In a nutshell, this conception of representation is intrinsically related with
the postulation of a notational-independent system for deep semantic analysis which
has been proposed to explain high-level case of unconscious priming effect indepen-
dent from notations (e.g. ”TWO” vs ”2” see Dehaene, Cohen, et al. 2005; Dehaene,
Naccache, et al. 1998). Notation independence is also the common finding of many
studies which show that Reaction Times in number comparison tasks remain the
same across Arabic (eg.2), number words (eg.TWO), roman numerals (eg. II) and
sets of objects (eg.••) (Barth, Kanwisher, and E. Spelke 2003; Barth, La Mont, et al.
2005; Dehaene and Akhavein 1995; Schwarz and Ischebeck 2000) which is supported
by many brain imaging studies (Eger et al. 2003; Naccache and Dehaene 2001; Pinel
et al. 2001) – see Verguts and Fias 2004 for a computational model of non-symbolic
encoding of symbols inspired by this literature and Herrera and Macizo 2008 for an
experimental effect consistent with this model.
Although we will try to disentangle these questions in sec.4, this theoretical chal-
lenge has also to do with the detraction of older symbolic-based models of cognition.
Here are the reasons why they assume that ”this internal access to quantity seems to
be a compulsory step in number processing [...]” (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and
Cohen 1998:358)
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Dissociated abilities However, this commitment in distinguishing an encoding sec-
tion before any computation puts under new lights selective deficits of calculation.
As an interesting clinical case, Mr M (Dehaene and Cohen 1997) suffers from dyscal-
culia which makes him unable to perform simple one digit subtractions such as 3-1
(75% of errors), magnitude comparison (14% of errors) or indicating which number
fell in the middle of two others (77%) while analogous problems about letters or days
of the week remain intact. Interestingly, addition and multiplication tasks remain
also intact because of the verbal memorization of tables during childhood (e.g. ”6
time 4, 24”).
Similar dissociations of verbal and memorized components of maths –such as
tables– from computational counterparts have also been suggested for other kind of
lesions (Takayama et al. 1994) and present interesting parallels with the results of
other fields of cognitive sciences which advocate for a verbal routine system different
from a symbolic and computational one (T. N. Carraher, D. W. Carraher, and
Schliemann 1987).
Neural imagery These clinical finding are consistent with the brain-imaging re-
sults summarized by Dehaene, Piazza, et al. 2003 – see tab.2 – which suggest that
some of the primary components of calculation are distributed in three distinct
regions of the occipital part of the brain. First, the horizontal segment of the in-
traparietal sulcus (HIPS) seems sensitive numerical quantities manipulations which
cannot be reduced to rote learning of tables. In contrast, verbally oriented tasks such
as multiplication and addition favour the Angular gyrus (AG). Finally, given that
the posterior superior parietal lobule (PSPL) is activated during number compari-
son, approximation during harder tasks, subtraction of two digits, counting (Piazza
12
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Tasks HIPS AG PSPL
Comparison of one-digit
numbers vs letter naming
Chochon et al.
1999
Subtraction of one digit
from 11 vs comparison of one-
digit numbers
Chochon et al.
1999
Subtraction of one digit
from 11 vs letter naming
Lee 2001
Subtraction of one-digit
numbers from 11 vs letter
naming
Simon et al.
2002
Subtraction vs multiplica-
tion of one-digit numbers
Lee 2001
Numerosity estimation vs
physical matching
Piazza et al.
2002b
Distance effect in compari-
son of two-digit numbers
Pinel et al. 2001 Pinel et al. 2001
Size effect in exact addition
of one-digit numbers
Stanescu-
Cosson et al.
2000
Inverse size effect in exact
addition of one-digit numbers
Stanescu-
Cosson et al.
2000
Multiplication vs compari-
son of one-digit numbers
Chochon et al.
1999
Multiplication vs subtrac-
tion of one-digit numbers
Lee 2001
Intersection of subtraction
and phoneme detection tasks
Simon et al.
2002
Approximate vs exact ad-
dition of one-digit numbers
Dehaene, E.
Spelke, et al.
1999
Table 2: Three regions involved in various mathematical tasks: summary of fMRI results
presented in Dehaene, Piazza, et al. 2003. ”vs” indicates that results have been obtained
by contrasting two tasks. Bold font indicate the relevant task.
et al. 2002a) and dual operations (Menon et al. 2000), we may consider that it acts
like an attentional system dedicated to numbers which manage resources for the
different operations.
3 Distributed Representations: a theoretical framework
Zhang and Norman 1995’s account for the cognitive dimension of mathematics is
far different from the one presented in sec.2 for it is mainly concerned with the
13
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representational effect of number systems – see McCloskey and Macaruso 1995 for
a contemporaneous taxonomy of forms of numerical representations. The reason
why has to do with Zhang’s general thesis following which human problem solving
is massively supported by external representations of the given problems. We will
present these general ideas in sec.3.1 before coming back on number systems in
sec.3.2.
3.1 Representational Effects as a General Framework for Problem Solv-
ing
As pointed out in Zhang 1997, the fact that problem solving relies on the external
representation of a given problem can be understood in two ways. The first, similar
to the theory presented in sec.2, consists in considering external representations
merely as a memory support similar to a Turing-machine tape, so to speak. In a
nutshell, the notion of encoding is central for this traditional view for it considers
problem solving as if the subject were i) encoding the visual data of a given problem
– say, ”3 + 4” – into a completely different internal representation of which she ii)
performs her operation before iii) re-encoding the answer– say ”7”.
The alternative view on external representations – initiated by Gibson 1966, 1979
– states that subjects exploit the ”highly structured-full of invariant information in
the extended spatial and temporal patterns of optic arrays” (Zhang 1997:181); i.e
visual environment. Moreover, it suggests that such a use of the spatial or structural
features of external stimuli does not suppose any use of the memory but rather
a simple pick up of the relevant environmental information for the given problem.
Thus, such a view advocates that the cognitive scientist interested in problem solving
14
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and, especially, mathematics has to deal with both internal, external representations
and the relation they entertain.
The key assumption of the framework is that external representations
need not be re-represented as an internal model in order to be involved
in problem solving activities: they can directly activate perceptual op-
erations and directly provide perceptual information that, in conjunc-
tion with the memorial information and cognitive operations provided
by internal representations, determine problem solving behavior. (Zhang
1997:187)
ER-based problem: an illustration As in analogy-based theories of problem-
solving (Holyoak 1984, 1990; Holyoak and Bower 1985; Holyoak, Junn, and Billman
1984; Holyoak and Thagard 1989), the notion of isomorphism between structures
of problems or representations is a central one. Though, ER-based theories such as
Norman 2010 explicitly focus on the relations between internal and external repre-
sentations in distinguishing these two components from Abstract Task Structures
which are most of the time unavailable to task performers.
The experiment presented in Zhang 1997 consists in performance comparison in
three isomorphic problems of the Tic-Tac-Toe (TTT) – see fig.3 – goal of which
consists in aligning first three X vertically, horizontally or diagonally – resp. O – in
a 3x3 grid-pattern to win the game. The number version – see fig.3 (B) – consists
in choosing number sum of which is equal to 15. The shape variation – see fig.3 (C)
– consists in choosing three circles that contain a common shape. Finally, the color
problem – not represented on fig.3 – consists in getting three circles that contain a
15
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Figure 3: Isomorphism of Abstract Task Structures
common color. We should stress that circles are not positioned on a grid pattern in
tasks B, C and D.
The reader may raise doubt about the isomorphism of such variations. However
beyond appearance, this three problems are isomorphic for every single functional
aspect of the original TTT has an equivalent in B and C – see fig.3. In this way,
5, the 4 shapes circle and the 4 colors circle are strictly equivalent to the center in
the original TTT inasmuch as they can be used in the 4 Winning Triplets. In a
nutshell, we also have the same Symmetry Categories, and Winning Invariants as
in the original TTT game.
However, this isomorphism concerns only Abstract Task Structures for there is
a fundamental difference between these problems on a representational level. For
instance, the only direct perceptual operation in the number variant consists in
identifying circles. Thus the only external representation in such a variation is
digit segmentation while all the relevant aspects of the task are encoded in internal
representations of numerical values, sums of digits and parity. In contrast, all the
data relevant to perform the Shape task such as i) circles ii) common shape circle or
iii) quantity of objects are directly observable. Thus, the only difference between the
Shape task and the original TTT task is that the directly perceived information of
16
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the former – a.k.a. Quantity of objects – may raise a ”more-is-better” bias different
from the ”central-is-better” bias of the later.
Results presented in Zhang 1997: 195–201 suggest that the disparity of per-
formances across tasks does not have merely to do with ”more-is-better” kind of
biases though the Number variation suffers from the worst constraint. Indeed, per-
formances across Color and Shape variations also differ though these tasks seem the
same. In a nutshell the reason why is related with the fact that the external rep-
resentation in the Shape variant underlines the discreteness of the physical entities
which have to be associated whereas this aspects is less striking in the Color task.
As a control experiment for his claim, Zhang also presented an other set of TTT
non-aligned variants which distinguish two key features, namely, task – TTT or
Color tasks – and a symmetrical vs asymmetrical conditions. The results present
very similar patterns of TTT and Color task for the asymmetrical condition both
for i) the first move, ii) rate of unsolved problem – i.e. 9 moves without wining
against the computer – and iii) rate of solved problems – above random. This
finding strongly suggests that external symmetry plays a critical role in suggesting
the Symmetry Categories of an Abstract Task Structure. To sum up, some visual
features may or may not represent the structural properties of a given problem
in a adequate fashion. In case of inadequacy, subjects rely massively on internal
representations without any direct and immediate external ones which explain the
biases.
3.2 Numbers, dimensions and external representations
17
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Despite the singularity of numbers systems in cognitive activities, the general frame-
work presented above has been proposed as an analysis for numbers systems in Zhang
and Norman 1995. Like any other problem-solving, a calculus relies on external rep-
resentations of the structural properties of a given number system. As a trivial
example, the division computed in fig.4 is only possible because of the positional
properties sketched in sec.1. However, we would like to give a more precise account
on this idea in this section for some more complex aspects of the relation entertained
between internal and external representations may have been forgotten.
Figure 4: Hand division in
Hindu-Arabic system
Dimension(s) As shown in sec.1, the notion of base
is a central one. Some trivial and primitive systems
do not use any distinct base to express numbers above
the extension of the base – e.g. the add one  sys-
tem sketched in sec.1 or an add-one-finger system
– whereas most of the systems developed in history
across different cultures use a base – most of the time,
10. In Zhang and Norman 1995’s vocabulary, such sys-
tems like Hindu-Arabic, Egyptian, Greek or Chinese are two dimensional (1x1D) for
they distinguish the base dimension from the power dimension (base x power) which
allow them to be decomposed in a polynomial fashion (
∑
aix
i for a the segment value
and x the base value) – see eq.4 p.5.
As we also saw it, some systems as the Babylonian but also the Mayan and the
Roman – which is a bit more complex case as we will see later on – systems use
two different bases – a main base and a smaller sub-base – which make them three
dimensional systems ((1x1) x1D). Before going any further, let’s take the example
18
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9# $ % ! & " ' ( ) *
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19+ , - . / 0 1 2 3 4
20 21 22 58 59 102 103 360 400 1377
#$ $$ %$ 3% 3% %" !" #3 ##$ 2)!
Table 3: Mayan system
of the Mayan system. Up to the limit of the main base, this system looks like any
other (1x1D) as tab.3 suggests it. However, above 19, the system starts to behave
strangely for someone accustomed to an SPNS such as the Hindu-Arabic system.
While the fact that, up to a certain point, a set of
!
”makes” a " is not
surprising for it seems the vertical equivalent of many (1x1D) systems presented in
tab.4, the fact that the system adds one level every time the limit (20) is reached
on the precedent level is more striking. Thus, the power every floor corresponds to
20level−1. As an example, eq.8 presents a decomposition of the Mayan equivalent for
1377 – see Zhang and Norman 1995:276 for a similar decomposition of the Babylonian
System.
3rd floor
!
(0 ∗ 51 + 3 ∗ 50) ∗ 202 =1200
2nd floor ) (1 ∗ 51 + 3 ∗ 50) ∗ 201 =160
1st floor
2
(3 ∗ 51 + 2 ∗ 50) ∗ 200 =17
1377
(8)
Representations What have been said above concerns only the Abstract Structures
or the deep logics of these numbers systems. On a representational level, the fact
that two systems have the same level of dimensionality does not mean that they
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Table 4: Some 1x1D systems
Base dimension Power dimension
α β γ δ ǫ ϝ ζ η θ ∗100
ι κ λ µ ν ξ o π ϙ ∗101
ρ σ τ υ φ χ ψ ω ϡ ∗102
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Table 5: Power dimensions in the Greek system
are the same for some systems would use different representations of their respective
dimensions. Typically, physical counterparts of dimensions could be Quantities (Q)
– i.e. number of symbols – Positions (P) or Shapes (S). Thus, while the Hindu-
Arabic, the Greek and the Egyptian systems belong to the (1x1D) family, the first
would represents the base with a symbol – e.g. ”6” – and the power dimension with
the rank on a line (SxP) while the others would use only shapes (Greek or Chinese:
SxS) or quantities and shapes (Egyptian: QxS) – see tab.4 for details. To highlight
this distinction, let’s note that, for the Egyptian system, ”∩ ∩ ∩ • • ” means the
same thing as ”• • ∩∩∩” or even ”∩ •∩ •∩” (32) though in a maybe less canonical
fashion.
The same remark holds for (SxS) systems such as the Greek system. Even if
the Greek alphabet is an ordoned set of symbols, the numerical system using these
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Table 6: Some (1x1)x1D systems
symbols does not behave as a SPNS for the power is represented by subsets of
this set of symbols defined by the alphabetical order. This point implies that σλβ
(2 ∗ 102 + 3 ∗ 101 + 2 ∗ 100 = 232) also has the same meaning as λβσ (2 ∗ 102 + 3 ∗
101 + 2 ∗ 100 = 232) even if, for practical reasons, symbols were ranked by power.
(1x1)x1D systems are also susceptible to represent their three dimensions in various
ways as tab.6 suggests it. To take our precedent example of the Mayan system, the
base is represented by the quantity of ! , the first power by shape’s difference –
! vs " – and the main power by positions (levels) – for more examples, see
Zhang and Norman 1995:279 or Ifrah 1987.
These technical aspects highlighted, the question of whether and how this rep-
resentational level will interact with the effective computation can be raised in ap-
propriate words. Here Zhang and Norman 1995 propose to investigate this question
with the same framework presented in sec.3.1 suggesting that systems differ from
each other in two main aspects, namely, i) the faculties used for identification and
the ii) externality of the representation of the relevant structural informations.
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Faculties While Shapes type of representations suggests a merely recognitional
faculty, Quantities and Positions involve different visual data type of which, say
symmetry, could interact with some operations. Though this first aspect may seem
a trivial one, it is quite obvious that, for different bases such as the 20-based Aztec
system, the fact that bases are represented by Quantities certainly has a cognitive
impact for it seems hard to distinguish •••••••••••• (12) from •••••••••••••
(13) in one gaze. However, this distinction could seem a bit sharp for one could easily
considers that symbols such as ! or ' implies a recognitional faculty similar
to the one used for, say, ”2” and ”7”. We will go back on this issue in sec.4.1.
Externality Besides this first superficial aspect, types of representations may
or may not represent externally the properties – category, magnitude, equal interval
and absolute zero – associated with the psychological scales – ratio, interval, ordinal
and nominal – qualified in Stevens 1946. To be more specific, whereas nominal
scales – e.g. a list of names – only have the formal property to distinguish their
elements (category), ordinal scales – e.g. rank of participants in a race – also have
an ordoned structure (category and magnitude). Adding equal intervals – e.g. there
is the same amount of time between 8AM and 10AM and 10AM and 12AM – to any
ordinal scale makes it a interval scale which only lack an absolute zero to behave
like a ratio scale – e.g. it does not have any sense to ask whether 10AM is twice as
late as 5AM. Thus ratio scales possess all the four formal characteristic properties of
numbers per se. However, numbers systems do not spatially implement these formal
characteristics in the same way.
The base and power dimensions of all numeration systems are abstract
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dimensions with ratio scales. In different numeration systems, these ab-
stract ratio dimensions are implemented by different physical dimensions
with their own scale types. (Zhang and Norman 1995:281)
To clarify this assertion, whereas Shapes, as a categorical formal property, involves
to represent all the other formal properties of number relations – e.g. ”x is next y”
(magnitude) or ”x is twice y” (equal interval and absolute zero) – in an internal
manner, the Quantity implementation of base dimension in the Egyptian system
makes these features directly accessible without any resort of memory. In other
words, the fact that ”||” is the next number after ”|” and that ”||||” is twice ”||” are
immediately visible as physical features in such a number system.
As soon as we consider more complex cases, typically two-dimensional systems
above base, interaction between the representations of dimensions makes interesting
predictions about tasks such as comparison and operations – see sec.3.3 – across
the different numerical systems. As an example, if both base and power dimensions
are represented by ordinal or more complex scales, all the information needed for
a magnitude comparison of two numbers is external which is not the case for cate-
gory-based systems such as the Greek Chinese – see fig.4 – or Hebrew systems. As
we saw it for the greek system, if one wants to know if φγ is higher than υµα, she
should first identify the symbol coding for the higher power – here φ and υ – to
know that φγ (503) is higher than υµα (441). Such a procedure depends massively
on memory which is not the case for a (SxP) systems as the Hindu-Arabic in which
positions make immediately visible that 441 is higher than 53. To conclude, rep-
resentational effects depends on both internal and external representation but also
on the interaction of these representations with the given dimension they represent.
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Rather than giving a complete account on the way different types of representations
across the different dimensions of a given system may interact with various tasks,
we would like to suggest this diversity with the example of multiplications.
3.3 Impact on calculation
Three levels in multiplication On an abstract level, a multiplication can be real-
ized in different ways. From addition iteration – see eq.9 – to polynomial decompo-
sition – see eq.10 and eq.11 for an example – the level described here corresponds to
the algebraic level properties of which are the direct consequence of the properties
of the division ring < Z,≤,+, ∗, 0, 1 >.
N1 ∗N2 =
n2 time︷ ︸︸ ︷
n1+n1+...+n1 (9)
N1 ∗N2 =
∑
aix
i ∗
∑
ajx
j =
∑ ∑
aix
iajx
j
=
∑ ∑
aiajx
i+j
(10)
43 ∗ 35 = (4 ∗ 3) ∗ 101+1 + (3 ∗ 3) ∗ 100+1 + (4 ∗ 5) ∗ 101+0 + (3 ∗ 5) ∗ 100+0
= 40 ∗ 30 + 3 ∗ 30 + 40 ∗ 5 + 3 ∗ 5
= 1200 + 90 + 200 + 15 = 1505
(11)
However, while we could think that polynomial decomposition constitutes some
king of algorithmic process, authors argue that ”[a]t the level of algorithms, differ-
ent algorithms can be applied to the same algebraic structure” (Zhang and Norman
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1995:285). Further, the polynomial structure would be the only genuine – i.e. non-
reducible to any additive process – multiplicative structure. Finally, ”For all 1x1D
systems, term multiplication (aix
i ∗ bjy
j) has the same set of six basic steps [i.e.
algorithm level]” (Zhang and Norman 1995:286) thus numeral system differ only
toward the level of number representation.
Algorithms for polynomial multiplications over ER Table 7 reproduce in a syn-
thetic manner the decomposition of the different steps of an algorithm. For every
single number system, the externality or internality induced by the different repre-
sentations – Quantities, Shapes or Positions – involved for every step is printed in
bold font. As a general observation, while the calculation step 2b is merely internal
for all these numbers systems, some others representationally-dependent steps differ-
entiate distinctly these systems and, more specifically, the Hindu-Arabic positional
notation of which enable the computing subject to base the power steps – 3b and 4
– solely on external representations.
Notwithstanding, the reader may oppose that the special status of the Hindu-
Arabic system is the direct consequence of the choice of the algorithm uniqueness
of which is dubious across these different systems. Steps 2b and 4 seem especially
questionable in the case of the Greek and Egyptian systems for they give the im-
pression of an isomorphic positional-based calculus despite the fact that, as shown
above, (SxS) and (QxS) systems behave very differently than (SxP) systems. In
other words, things are presented as if Quantities of • and Shapes were computed
following the rules of a positional based system before a miracle occurs – ∗101 on
step 4.
However, Zhang and Norman 1995 never claimed that the algorithm was unique
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Step Abstract Greek (λ ∗ δ) Egyptian (∩ ∩ ∩ ∗ ||||) Arabic (30 ∗ 4)
1 separate power from base internal external external
2a get base values of internal (S) external (Q) internal (S)
aix
i ∗ bjy
j
B(aix
i) = ai B(λ) = γB(δ) = δ B(∩ ∩ ∩) = ||| B(30) = 3
B(bjy
j) = bj B(δ) = δ B(||||) = |||| B(4) = 4
2b multiply base values internal (mult. tab) internal (mult. tab) internal (mult. tab)
ai ∗ bj = cij γ ∗ δ = ιβ ||||∗|||= ∩|| 3 ∗ 4 = 12
3a get power values of internal (S) internal (S) external (P)
aix
i ∗ bjy
j
P (aix
i) = i P (λ) = 1 P (∩ ∩ ∩) = 1 P (30) = 1
P (bjy
j) = j P (δ) = 0 P (||||) = 0 P (4) = 0
3b add power values internal (add. tab) internal (add. tab) external (S)
P (aix
ibjy
j) = 1 + 0 P (λ ∗ δ) = 1 + 0 P (∩ ∩ ∩ ∗ ||||) = 1 + 0 P (30 ∗ 4) = 1 + 0
4 attach power values internal (S) internal (S) external (S)
aix
i ∗ bjy
j = cij ∗ x
P ij ιβ ∗ 101 = ρκ ∩||∗101 = ∩ ∩ 12 ∗ 101 = 120
Table 7: Steps implementations across various 1x1D systems
for different algorithms may use these six basic steps in different orders and group
partial products in a different fashion than a contemporaneous westerner. As an
example, eq.12 presents an Hindu-Arabic algorithm which follows the same order
than tab.7 taking first the base values of N1 and N1 (2a) before adding the power
values (3b). In contrast, the Greek algorithm presented in eq.13 groups the partial
products in a different way inasmuch as it attaches first the power values to bases
before adding the results. In other words, even if the six steps are necessary to
perform a calculation, the order, induced by the specificities of a given numbers
system, can change with some restriction to make a system-specific algorithm easier
to manipulate in the given number system.
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Abstract Form Greek System Arabic System
a1x
1 a0x
0 ι ζ 1 7
b1x
1 b0x
0 ι γ 1 3
a0b0x
0 κ α 2 1
a1b0x
1 λ 3
a0b1x
1 o 7
a1b1x
2 ρ 1
a1b1x
2 + (a1b0x
1 + a0b1x
1) + a0b0x
0 σ κ α 2 2 1
(12)
What makes the Hindu-Arabic system so special? As a conclusion of this
section, we could ask whether the Hindu-Arabic is special in the strict sense induced
sometimes with the idea that mathematics would have been impossible without
such a system. As shown above, the Hindu-Arabic system is not the only positional
system for some other systems also use positions to represent the power dimension –
see fig.6. However, it is indeed the only (SxP) system among 1x1D systems specificity
of which is responsible for the algorithm used to perform some calculations such as
multiplication. Once again, this does not mean that other methods are impossible
– see eq.13 for a counterexample – nor does it mean that such methods are less
effective in general. Even if the Arabic system is more efficient for large numbers
and that its multiplication tables are smaller than the one required for, say, the
Aztec system (base =20), ”the abacus, which was still widely used in Japan, China,
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and Russia before electronic calculators became popular, is more efficient than the
Arabic system for addition and subtraction” (Zhang and Norman 1995:292).
To summarize, the representational effect of numbers systems has to do with
the way the externality (resp. internality) of the representations of the different
dimensions interacts with mathematical tasks. From magnitude comparison to mul-
tiplication, the way properties of numbers are visually encoded will give rise to an
algorithm specific to the given task and number system or, in other words, a spe-
cific correspondence of external rules or constraints towards external representations
with their internal counterparts.
Abstract Form Greek System Arabic System
a1x
1 a0x
0 ι ζ 10 7
b1x
1 b0x
0 ι γ 10 3
a1b1x
2 a1b0x
1 ρ λ 100 30
a0b1x
1 a0b0x
0 o κα 70 21
(a1b1x
2 + a0b1x
1) + (a1b0x
1 + a0b0x
0) ρo υα σκα 170 51 221
(13)
4 When problem solving finally discuss with neurology
How could we possibly compare these two very different cognitive approaches of
mathematics ? Given that the first one –sec.2– endorse an internalist and numerosity-
based conception of number representation which relies on neural effects of low
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level tasks and that the second one –sec.3– suggests a distributed representations
paradigm based on a problem-solving methodology, it is not surprising that these
two framework did not discuss directly before Zhang and Wang 2005. In this section,
we would like to suggest that the direct question to whether numbers are or are not
internally represented as continua or as format-independent analog representations
is not a good one while the scale problem is not disentangled. We will first underline
the weaknesses of both frameworks – sec.4.1 and sec.4.2 – to suggest in a third time
how these frameworks could benefits from each other.
4.1 Some problems with the Distributed Representations framework
Besides the extreme generality of a framework used in many context from usability
criterion for graphic user interfaces (Zhang 1996) to medical errors (Zhang, Patel,
et al. 2004), Zhang and Norman 1995 lack a criterion for say ”entities” from other
visual representations. As an example, quantities are said to differ from shapes type
of representations. This difference is crucial for it justify the idea that a (SxP) system
such as the Hindu-Arabic does not represent the base dimension in the same way that
a (SxP) system such as the Egyptian. More generally, a similar criterion is applied for
all the nomenclature proposed in tab.4 p.20 and tab.6 p.21. However, when the time
to distinguish external from external representations of formal properties comes, the
difference of ||| from, say, || (category) becomes immediately available which seems
to imply a recognitional faculty very similar that the one used for Shapes as we
pointed it out in sec.3.2. Therefore, given the fact that the cognitive taxonomy
proposed in tab.4 p.20 and tab.6 p.21 contradicts what is said about the externality
of the category property, the criterion for say entities such as • from combinations of
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these (say ••) is merely a graphical and syntactical one – very similar with the one
proposed in sec.1 in fact – which relies on key assumptions concerning deep logical
structures of numerical systems.
Furthermore, even 1x1D and (1x1)x1D systems are not easily distinguishable
from a graphical components analysis. One could easily oppose that putting apart
deep logical structures of number systems on one hand and the representations of
such dimensions on the other before linking them is illusory or circular given the fact
that the distinction of dimensions presuppose some assumptions about the behavior
of the graphical components. To go back on our example, instead of a (QxS)xP
system, the Mayan system could be considered as (SxP) 20-based system provided
that & " ' are interpreted as symbols or digits similar with the Hindu-Arabic
system (4,5,6). In other word, what does assure that this system is not more coarse-
grained except an intuition that & and " are, contrary ' , to the primitive
(cognitive) components of such a system.
4.2 Issues with the Neuro-internalist approach
On the other hand, the internalist conception endorsed by most of the cognitive-
neuroscience part of the literature suffers from opposite problems for i) it relies on
deep assumptions about the necessity of encoding before effective computation (see
cit. p.11) ii) supported by low level tasks such as digits comparison which iii) use
different notations only in trivial cases.
First of all, we should notice that these problems have been putted under lights
from a part of the cognitive-neuroscience community itself. In this regard, variations
of typical tasks used in this fields to induce mathematical-related brain activities
30
4 WHEN PROBLEM SOLVING FINALLY DISCUSS WITH NEUROLOGY
together with more precise brain-imaging technics than fMRI (anatomical resolution
of 3x3x3 mm) such as fMRA allowed Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007 to propose clusters
sensitive to certain notations. Though, we consider that the issue goes beyond the
notation (in)dependent or (non)symbolic issue for, as we suggested it in sec.3.3,
magnitude comparison across notations involve very specific mechanisms different
from those of calculation. Furthermore, we also saw that systems differ mainly
above the power base while comparisons often proposed by this literature concern
numbers below 10. In other words, it is not surprising that •• and || may rise the
same numerosity signal provided that the base dimension in encoded with Quantities
and that the non-quantitative encoding –e.g. ”TWO” and ”2”– are familiar. Finally,
given that cardinality is said to be the only relevant external feature extracted from
sets (like in a 1D system), this approach cannot account for the immediate use of
the structural properties of notations which are the sine qua none conditions to
represent numbers above the cognitive limits of discrimination – see fig.5.
What does append beyond the base? As a first direct discussion of the two
frameworks Zhang and Wang 2005 missed a decisive aspect of the debate inasmuch
as they choose to ignore the fact that most of the studies in this field do not deal
with complex tasks –a.k.a. scale problem– to ask directly whether the so-called
sequential model endorsed by Dehaene 1992; Dehaene, Dupoux, and Mehler 1990
is valid in number comparison paradigm. However, the results for variants of the
classical two-digits number comparison presented in Zhang and Wang 2005 suggest
that some of the internalist neuro-scientists who investigate these mathematical tasks
did not take in consideration any representational effect. Experiments presented in
Dehaene, Dupoux, and Mehler 1990; Hinrichs, Berie, and Mosell 1982 consisted in
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saying whether some two-digits numbers were above or below 55. Yet, changing
three parameters – i) presenting simultaneously two targets with the standard ii)
using two different standard (55 and 65) and iii) ask the subject which target is
smaller (resp. larger in exp.2) rather than if a sole target is smaller (resp. larger)
than the standard – produces some effects presence of which across the different
situations is not predictable without representational effects; namely
Unit-effect the fact that numerals within the same decade (e.g. 31–39) have dif-
ferent RTs
Decade effect the fact that the mean RTS of different decades (e.g. 31–39 and
61–69) are different
Discontinuity effect which consists in sharp changes in RTs across the boundaries
Strop-like effect the fact that unit digits may interfere or facilitate the comparison
of two digits numeral (e.g. the 1 of 21 could facilitate the comparison while
the 9 of 29 interfere with it)
Without detailing the weighted results across conditions, the difference in stan-
dards (55 and 65) together with the presence (resp. absence) of the effects advo-
cates for a huge effect of external representations. However, the very experimental
paradigm adopted in Zhang and Wang 2005 – i.e. the fact that standards were pre-
sented simultaneously with targets rather than memorized – cannot judge whether
merely internal representations are notation-specific for their experiment uses direct
perceptions of numbers. In other words, the tasks are not the same thus do not test
the same faculties. We would like to disentangle this deadlock in the next subsection.
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4.3 How to solve the Scale Problem: some proposals
Figure 5: Cardinality
vs structural properties
(Card(A) = Card(C),
Card(B) = Card(D) and
Card(A) − Card(B) =
Card(C)− Card(D) = 1)
It seems obvious that, for large numbers or complex
operations, the mind will relies on specialized repre-
sentations in accordance with the number system he
uses generally – see sec.3.3. The idea that representa-
tional differences constraint the development of algo-
rithms specific to a given number system – see eq.13
p.28 – is also parsimonious enough to be endorsed.
For example, the studies by Gonzalez and
Kolers 1982, 1987 suggest that Arabic and
Roman numerals were processed differently.
They argue that during numerical process-
ing people do not transform different ex-
ternal number representations into a common abstract internal repre-
sentation. Rather, they operate upon different internal representations
that reflect the physical characteristics of different external representa-
tions.(Zhang and Wang 2005:832)
However what is not so clear is whether such a spatial and notation-specific
representation is required for more easy tasks and from which degree of complexity
it might be so. In other words, what is not sure is whether notations matter when
we solve 3-1. Here is what can be labeled as the scale problem which happens on
both part of the debate. For the Zhang and Norman 1995’framework, it concerns
the distinction of quantities from shapes, as we saw in sec.4.1, for it seems possible
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to consider that
'
is a symbol just like ”6”. On the other side, the internalist
account of Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen 1998 plays at an other level
inasmuch as the putative compulsory encoding for computation i) concerns mainly
numbers below 10 ii) which are, so to speak, thought and not visualized – externaly
or internaly – like in a complex operations.
Thus, given the fact that the former deals with ER-based complex operations
without being able to give a precise account on units and that, conversely, the later
is mainly concerned with internal representation simplicity of which do not have
anything to do with algorithmic manipulations of numbers, it would not be exces-
sive to suggest that these frameworks do not contradict each other and might be
complementary. As an example, we saw in sec.2 that the posterior superior parietal
lobule (PSPL) is considered to be involved in dual tasks. Thus, given that some
operations do require such dual tasks – e.g. keep 3 to add it to the product of 2*6
for 25*6 – and that such operations do depend on the given number system, the
possibility that numerosity-based computation works together with a more distribu-
tive tasks system algorithms of which are sensitive to external representations is still
open as an empirical inquiry.
New account on the SNARC effect Originally discovered by Dehaene, Bossini,
and Giraux 1993, the Spacial-Numerical Association of Response Code effect have
been invoked to support the idea that values or numerosities are linearly ordonned
on a mental line inasmuch as, no matter how irrelevant the magnitude can be in
tasks such as odd–even classifications, response times are faster with left hand for
small digits (e.g. 2) and with right hand for large digits (e.g. 9). This interaction of
space and number was the only interaction of numbers representations with space
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endorsed by these authors.
Though, current research on the SNARC effect suggests that this effect might be
dependent on cultural diversity – Cf the case of Iranian and Japanese subjects in
Hubbard et al. 2005 – and that two-digit number behave differently (Nuerk, Weger,
and Willmes 2001; Nuerk and Willmes 2005), suggesting that ”[...] the mental
representation of two-digit numbers depended on the stage of processing” (Zhou et
al. 2008:1535)
The initial processing seemed to involve the compositions of the two-digit
numbers as shown by the significant distance and magnitude effects for
unit digits in Experiment 2 (simultaneous presentation). Once the num-
bers are stored in the short-term memory, however, they showed holistic
representation, as shown by a lack of distance and magnitude effects for
unit digits in Experiment 1 (serial presentation).(Zhou et al. 2008:1535)
This quotation is interesting for three reasons. It first insists on the impact of
presentation modes – simultaneous or serial – thus on the fact that Dehaene, Bossini,
and Giraux 1993 and Zhang and Wang 2005 do not investigate the same mechanisms
– see also Ganor-Stern, Pinhas, and Tzelgov 2009. Further, the idea that a compo-
sitional representation of multi-digits numbers is distributed across different levels
of processing – see. Notebaert et al. 2006 for similar results – might give an account
on the scale problem inasmuch as the question of whether the different dimensions
of a given number system correspond to distinct representational processes becomes
an empirical opened question – see Wood, Nuerk, and Willmes 2006 for an fMRI
manifestation of these levels. To take our previous example, given that one can dis-
sociate simultaneous and serial presentation for many kind of numerals, it would be
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empirically possible to decide whether
'
is a composed representational compo-
nent distinct from more primitive ones or a primitive symbol for the given cognitive
subject.
Finally, such an impact of the visual field on number representations suggests
that the positional nature of the Hindu-Arabic system do interfere with the way these
numbers are internally represented and analyzed. To sum up, while representational
effect in mathematics was only endorsed by the problem-solving fields during the
90’, this question tends to be raised in many different scientific communities from
embodied problem-solving (Domahs et al. 2010; O¨llinger, Jones, and Knoblich 2008)
to neuro-imaging (Liu et al. 2006; Pesenti et al. 2000). Even if more oriented toward
the Hindu-Arabic based representations, all the methodological and theoretical tools
required to give a precise account on distinct influences of space – i.e. representations
– on internal representations of numbers across different numeral systems are now
endorsed by the relevant cognitive fields.
Why do not we use abstract grammars? In this last paragraph, we would like
to put forward an experimental paradigm which haven’t been endorsed by this field
despite its obvious relevance. Abstract grammars are sets of syntactical rules which
describe the set of possible chunks of a given language. First popularized by Reber
1967, the use of abstract grammars in experimental investigation of learning mech-
anisms has shown interesting sensitivity for properties such as symmetry of chunks
(Jiang et al. 2012; Mealor and Dienes 2012).
We suggest that using the subjective acceptability of chunks generated from
abstract grammar could be a good way to investigate the cognitive effect of visual
features for i) such grammars would be isomorphic with existent systems while ii)
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they do not need strong assumptions about the dimensional structures of existing
numbers systems iii) and do not induce any surface bias consecutive from previous
Hindu-Arabic knowledge. As an illustration of the kind of chunks the subject could
be presented during training, given what has been said in sec.3, eq.14 is isomorphic
with a subtraction in a (QxS) system – such as the Egyptian – while eq.15 and eq.15
match respectively with multiplication in (SxP) system – such as the Hindu-Arabic
– and addition in a (SxS) system – such as the Greek.
♣♣♣♣N⋆ ⋉⋆♣ = ♣♣♣N (4111− 1001 = 3110) (14)
⊡⊟⊟⋊⊟ = ⊟⊞⊞ (122 ∗ 2 = 244) (15)
ak ∔ ld = me (11 + 24 = 35) (16)
Conclusion
By confronting two traditions and their respective account on the cognitive di-
mension of mathematics (sec.2 and sec.3), we suggested that the naive question of
whether numbers internal representations are notation independent does not have
any sense if asked abstractly. As we saw it in sec.4, such a question depends on
the level of complexity together with the external availability of numbers during the
given task.
To sum up, representational effects of numbers systems are obvious for complex
tasks and do depend on the external availability of various properties of numbers.
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While this idea has exclusively been endorsed by the problem solving fields since
the 90’, most of the neuro-scientific part of the research focused on low level tasks
supporting a merely internalist conception of numbers representations. Yet, such an
antagonism together with the absence of any direct discussion of these frameworks
do not mean that they contradict each other for i) hybrid models are nowadays
endorsed by a part of the literature (Zhou et al. 2008) ii) which seems able to
provide empirical evidence for distinguishing base from power dimensions.
As said in the end of sec.1, it does not seem plausible that a human subject scan
every digit following syntactical rules. However, the idea that numbers perception
and manipulation do require compositional structures for more primitive components
is quite obvious. What remains an empirical issue concerns the level of complexity of
theses primitive components. Finally, even if the majority of this literature focuses
exclusively on the representational effects induced by SPNS such as the Hindu-
Arabic, research on the impact of different spacial properties of n-SPNS is easily
conceivable and, actually, endorsed by some teams guided by the idea that algorithms
are sensitive to such visual properties (Domahs et al. 2010; O¨llinger, Jones, and
Knoblich 2008). As a final word, we would like to highlight the indispensability of
similar accounts on n-SPNS effects for they appear the best way to contrast the
cognitive particularities induced by SPNS.
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